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CASE COMMENTS
Taxation -

Subchapter S - Relaxation of the

One Class of Stock Requirement
Shores Realty Company, a Florida corporation incorporated in
1960 for the purpose of developing real estate, filed a timely election
to be taxed as a small business corporation under Subchapter S of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Four shareholders, Raymond V.
Guernsey and his wife, and Emerson D. Wertz and his wife, owned
equal amounts of the corporation's stock. To complete the financing
of the corporation, the shareholders made disproportionate advances
of funds for which they were issued unsecured demand notes.' Acting
pursuant to Treasury regulation section 1.1371-1(g),2 the Commissioner determined that the loans to the corporation constituted equity
and a second class of stock. The company therefore was not entitled
to Subchapter S treatment. 3 Accordingly, deficiencies were assessed;
these were paid and the company sued for a refund. The district court
determined that the advances did not constitute a second class of
stock; 4 on appeal the Fifth Circuit held, affirmed.
Although the Court correctly characterized the advances as
IThe advances were carried on the taxpayers' books as loans and were
made in a series commencing on March 18, 1960. The unsecured demand
notes provided for interest at the rate of 6% annually. The note indicated
corporate debts amounting to $30,000 to Emerson D. Wertz, $11,000 to
Raymond V. Guernsey, and $17,000 to Guernsey Investment Company, a
business owned by Guernsey and his wife. Neither Mrs. Wertz nor Mrs.
Guernsey made any individual contributions.
2 Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1(g) (1967) states:
A corporation having more than one class of stock does not qualify
as a small business corporation .... Obligations which purport to
represent debt but which actually represent equity capital will generally constitute a second class of stock. However, if such purported
debt obligations are owned solely by the owners of the nominal stock
of the corporation in substantially the same proportion as they own
such nominal stock, such purported debt obligations will be treated as
contributions to capital rather than a second class of stock. But,
if an issuance, redemption, sale, or other transfer of nominal stock,
or of purported debt obligations which actually represent equity
capital, results in a change in a shareholder's proportionate share of
nominal stock or his proportionate share of such purported debt, a new
determination shall be made as to whether the corporation has more
than one class of stock as of the time of such change.
3 For the corporation to continue to qualify, it must not at any time
subsequent to the election fail to meet the initial qualification requirements,
including the requirement that the corporation have only one class of stock.
INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 1372(e) (3).
4 Shores Realty Co. v. United States, 71-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
9211 (S.D. Fla.
1971).
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equity, it found that they did not constitute a second class of stock.
Given a Subchapter S situation, the application of debt-equity analysis
and the proportionality standard in Treasury regulation section
1.1371-1(g) was improper and exceeded the Commissioner's authority. Shores Realty Co. v. United States, 468 F.2d 572 (5th Cir.

1972).
Subehapter S of the Code was enacted in 1958 to permit businesses "to select the form of business organization desired without the
necessity of taking into account major differences in tax consequence."'5 Instead of accomplishing this purpose, Subchapter S has
created a number of unique tax problems. To qualify for Subchapter
S exemption, several basic requirements must be met by the electing
corporation. 6 If, at any time, the corporation is found to have violated
any one of these requirements, it will be subject to taxation under
Subehapter C. 7 This may force the corporation to pay unplanned
additional taxes.
The one class of stock requirements,8 as interpreted by the
Commissioner, poses particular problems for the electing business. In
the regulations, the Commissioner states that "[o]bligations which
purport to represent debt but which actually represent equity capital
will generally constitute a second class of stock." 9 This has led to the

application of debt-equity analysis' ° to Subchapter S corporations.
5
6 S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1958).

1NT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1371(a), states that a small business corporation electing Subchapter S status must not:
(1) have more than 10 shareholders;
(2) have as a shareholder a person (other than an estate) who is not
an individual;
(3) have a non-resident alien as a shareholder; or
(4) have more than one class of stock.
7 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1372(e) (3). A termination of the Subchapter
S election will also cause a "locked-in earnings" problem. Any earnings and
profits upon which the shareholder has paid taxes but which have not been
distributed, will be subject to taxation as a dividend under § 301 if distributed
by the corporation to the shareholders after termination of the election. B.
BrrrKER & J. EUSTiCE, FEDERAL INcoME TAxATiON OF CoRPoRAtoNs & SHARHOLDERS,
6.08 (3d ed. 1971).
8
INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1371(a) (4).
9
Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1(g) (1967). See note 2, supra.
10 There are at least eleven separate determining factors generally used
by the courts in determining whether amounts advanced to a corporation constitute equity capital or indebtedness. They are (1) the names
given to the certificates evidencing the indebtedness; (2) the presence
or absence of a maturity date; (3) the source of the payments; (4)
the right to enforce payment of principal and interest; (5) participation
in management; (6) a status equal to or inferior to that of regular
corporate creditors; (7) the intent of the parties; (8) "thin" or
adequate capitalization; (9) identity of interest between creditor and
stockholder; (10) payment of interest only out of "dividend" money;
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Treasury regulation section 1.1371-1(g) originally indicated that
if the Commissioner found that purported debt was actually equity, it
would be considered a second class of stock." Several cases upheld
this view,' 2 but in 1966 the tax court found the regulation partially
invalid. In W.C. Gamman, 3 the court held that though some debt
instruments might represent equity capital, they would not be found
to constitute a second class of stock if the advances were made and the
notes held by shareholders in direct proportion to their interests. 14 In
1967, the Commissioner amended the regulation in compliance with
the Gamman holding,"5 but he has had little success applying the
amended regulation. In 1968, the tax court indicated that the shareholders' intent to make the loans proportionately was sufficient to
prevent the creation of a second class of stock. 6 In 1970, the court
took another step toward invalidating Treasury regulation section
1.1371-1(g). In James L. Stinnett, Jr.,7 the tax court refused to find
the proportionality requirement controlling. The majority found that
an instrument purporting to represent debt, which amounted to a
simple installment note having none of the incidents commonly
attributed to stock, did not constitute a second class of stock simply
(11)

the ability of the corporation to obtain loans from outside

lending institutions.
0. H. Kruse Grain & Milling Co. v. Conm'r, 279 F.2d 123, 125-26 (9th Cir.
1960).
" The regulation in question originally stated, "If an instrument purporting
to be a debt obligation is actually stock, it will constitute a second class of
stock." Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1(g), T.D. 6432, 1960-1 Cum. BuLL. 321.
12Henderson v. United States, 245 F. Supp. 782 (M.D. Ala. 1965); Catalina
Homes, Inc., 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1361 (1964).
13 46 T.C. 1 (1966); accord, Lewis Bldg. & Supplies, Inc., 25 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 844 (1966).
14 46 T.C. at 9. Gamman was the subject of considerable commentary and
gave rise to a discussion of the applicability of debt-equity analysis to the Subchapter S situation. The Gamman decision is analyzed in Note, Shareholder
Lending and Tax Avoidance in the Subchapter S Corporation, 67 CoLuM. L.
REv. 495 (1967); Comment, Debt Obligationof SubchapterS CorporationHeld
not to Constitute Second Class of Stock, 41 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1012 (1966);
Comment, Shareholder Advances to "Thin" Subchapter S Corporations, 19
STAN. L. REv. 628 (1967); Comment, Subchapter S-Classes of Stock, 20
Sw. L.J. 234 (1966); Comment, Thin IncorporationNot Tantamount to Disqualification From Subchapter S, 19 VAND L. REV. 1401 (1966); Comment,
Disputed Uses of Debt by Subchapter S Corporations,41 WAsH. L. Rnv. 856
(1966).
IsTreas. Reg. § 1.1371-1(g) now states that purported debt obligations
which the Commissioner finds to represent equity capital will not be considered
a second class of stock if held by the shareholders in proportion to their shares
of the nominal stock in the corporation. See note 2, supra.
16Milton T. Raynor, 50 T.C. 762, 769 (1968).
1754 T.C. 221 (1970). The tax court followed the Stinnett decision in
Estate of William M. Allison, 57 T.C. 174 (1971), and H. R. Spinner Corp., 29
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 462 (1970).
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because the debt created disproportionate rights among the shareholders to corporate assets.'
The decision in Shores Realty made the validity of section
1.1371-1(g) even more questionable. The Commissioner argued that
by applying debt-equity analysis to the loans made by the shareholders
of Shores Realty Company, it became evident that the purported debt
constituted equity. Equity capital that was given disproportionately by
the shareholders created rights upon corporate distributions and
liquidation that made the purported debt obligations preferred over
common stock; but the common stock retained a preference as to
voting rights. The Commissioner reasoned that these characteristics of
preferred stock were sufficient cause for him to reclassify the purported debt and regard it as a second class of stock. The court disregarded the proportionality criterion, stating that it found no support
for the proposition that Congress, in adopting Subchapter S, had
intended to create such a standard. The court also noted that section
1376(b)(2)19 of the Code is indicative of congressional intent to
allow loans to a small business corporation by its stockholders.
The court in Shores Realty essentially followed Stinnett20 but
took one additional step. It concluded that there was "no basis in law"
for the Commissioner's attempt to inject debt-equity analysis into the
application of the one class of stock requirement. 2' The court's reasoning was based on the legislative history of Subehapter S and the
lack of evidence of legislative concern with the debt-equity capitaliza22
tion problem in the history of the one class of stock requirement.
1854 T.C. at 232. The Stinnett decision, like Gamman, has been the subject
of commentary. Note, Disproportionate Advances by Shareholders of Subchapter S Corporationand the One Class of Stock Requirement, 31 LA. L. RBV.
510 (1971); Comment, The One-Class-of-Stock Requirement of Subchapter S
and the Invalidation of Treasury Regulation 1.1371-1(g), 50 B.U.L. Rnv. 577

(1970).

19INT. Rav. CODE of 1954, § 1376(b) (2) states that:
The basis of any indebtedness of an electing small business corporation
to a shareholder of such corporation shall be reduced (but not below
zero) by an amount equal to the amount of the shareholder's portion
of the corporation's net operating loss for any taxable year (as determined under section 1374(c)), but only to the extent that such amount
exceeds the adjusted basis of the stock of such corporation held by the
shareholder.
2054 T.C. 221 (1970).
21 Shores Realty Co. v. United States, 468 F.2d 572, 577 (5th Cir. 1972).
22Te one class of stock requirement appears to have been included largely
because of a desire on the part of Congress to avoid the administrative complexities inherent in the allocation of rights, profits, and responsibilities where
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On the same day that Shores Realty was decided, a second panel
of judges in the Fifth Circuit came to a different conclusion as to the
applicability of debt-equity analysis to the Subchapter S corporation.
In Amory Cotton Oil Co. v. United States,23 the court concluded that
a true inquiry can be made only when debt-equity is viewed in
conjunction with "the underpinnings of Subchapter S and the rationale
of the one class of stock requirement.12 4 The court, however, refused
to accept the proportionality requirement for shareholder loans and
ruled that section 1.1371-1(g) is "both facially and in its application
in this case . . . arbitrary and beyond the power of the Commis-

sioner.""
The Seventh Circuit has recently joined the Fifth Circuit in
overruling section 1.1371-1(g). In Portage Plastics Co. v. United
States,26 the Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed a two to one
decision by a three-judge panel that had upheld the Commissioner's
application of the regulation. 2 The court indicated that the thin
more than one class of stock is involved. An analysis of the Senate Reports in
which this requirement was discussed may be found in McGaffey, The Requirement that a Subchapter S CorporationMay Have Only One Class of Stock, 50
MARQ. L. Rnv. 365, 366-70 (1966). A discussion of the debt-equity characterization problem, with alternative methods of applying this approach to the one
class of stock requirement, and the possible tax consequences of such application
may be found in Bravenec, The One Class of Stock Requirement of Subehapter
S -A Round Peg in a PentagonalHole, 6 Hous. L. Rlv. 215, 242-46 (1968).
23468 F.2d 1046 (5th Cir. 1972). The corporation had elected to be taxed
as a Subchapter S corporation. The Commissioner sued for deficiencies in income tax payments, alleging, as in Shores Realty, that disproportionate advances
had been made to the corporation by the stockholders in such a manner as to
amount to a second class of stock. The corporation paid the deficiencies and
sued for refund of $108,834.52.
241d. at 1054.
251d. The court in Shores Realty also held Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1 (g) to be
invalid. 468 F.2d at 578.
2673-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9261 (7th Cir. 1973). Two individuals, who were
not shareholders in the electing corporation, made advances of $25,000 to the
corporation in 1957. The articles of incorporation had originally authorized the
issuance of $10,000 worth of stock. In 1962, the articles were amended to
authorize the issuance of an additional $190,000 worth of stock at par value.
The notes taken by the individuals made no provision for the repayment of the
amounts advanced in the event of default. Each individual had the right to
renew their note at the end of five years. They were to be paid "interest"
amounting to 5% of the corporation's net profits before taxes. Both subordinated
their notes to bank loans to the corporation. The interest was paid until 1963
when the instruments were exchanged for common stock in the corporation.
27470 F.2d 308 (7th Cir. 1972). This three-judge panel had reversed a
lower court decision against the Commissioner. In the latter decision, the district
court had applied debt-equity analysis and determined that the purported loans
amounted to equity capital but had refused to find that they represented a
second class of stock. The majority of the circuit court panel indicated that the
failure to take this step was error and attempted to distinguish this case on its
facts from the cases decided by the Fifth Circuit.
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capitalization doctrine could still be applied in the Subchapter S con-

text "where appropriate to deny particular tax benefits wrongfully
taken in those cases where tax avoidance through the use of debt is

still available.
..."1 It refused, however, to apply the debt-equity
criteria where the only issue was whether a purported debt should be
considered a second class of stock.
Judicial disapproval of the Commissioner's approach to the one
class of stock requirement has now been clearly indicated. Still, until

the regulation is changed or until each circuit has had the opportunity
to rule on its validity, the possibility remains that it may be resurrected
and enforced.
Congressional action to clarify Subchapter S seems the logical
solution to the problem. The potential for dispute in this area has
been recognized since Subchapter S was enacted," and many proposals
for change have been made;30 yet, the law remains as it was adopted in
1958. Given the failure of Congress to effect legislative reform in this
area and the confusion in the courts over the applicability of debt-

equity analysis to Subchapter S corporations, the safest approach is
to comply whenever possible with the Commissioner's standards as
stated in the regulation. If it is necessary for the small business corporation to borrow from its shareholders, the loans should be made
proportionate to the holding of stock. The corporation should carefully
comply with the debt-equity standards used by the Commissioner; the
debt should always "be represented by unambiguous instruments
73-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9261 n.3 (7th Cir. 1973).
Caplin, Subchapter S and Its Effect on the Capitalizationof Corporations,
13 VAND.
L. REv. 185 (1950).
30
28

29

One authority contends that Subchapter S is defective and ought to be

repealed. He argues that its repeal should be accompanied by the enactment of
a law permitting the extension of the partnership provisions to such corporations. 7 J. MERTENS, FEDERAL LAW OF INCOME TAXATxON § 4113.44 (Malone
rev. ed. 1967). A second alternative that has been advocated is simply to allow
the Subchapter S corporation to have more than one class of stock. Pennell,
Subchapter S- The Need for Legislation, 24 TAx LAwvrt 249 (1971). The
problem in this area was recognized by the committee proposing changes in the
tax laws to be incorporated into the Tax Reform Act of 1969. It proposed that
"the existence of any interest not designated as stock, which has neither voting
rights nor rights to distributions beyond a fixed annual interest rate and a fixed
amount upon redemption or payment, will not cause the corporation to be disqualified even if the interest is determined to be equity capital." Hearings on
Tax Reform Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 14, at 5232 (1969). This proposal was not adopted. For an analysis of
the changes to Subchapter S that were suggested for the Tax Reform Act of
1969, see Rosenkrantz, Subchapter S: The PresidentialProposals,55 A.B.A.J.
1181 (1969). Criticism may be found in Note, An Approach to Legislative
Revision of Subchapter S, 26 TAX L. Rnv. 799, 806-09 (1971).
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which include, at least, a definite maturity date and reasonable interest
provisions and on which prompt payments are made."'"
W. Richard McCune, Jr.
31Note, An Approach to Legislative Revision of Subchapter S, 26 TAX L.
Ray. 799, 808 (1971). More detailed suggestions for making loans to Subchapter S corporations without violating Treasury regulation section 1.1371'1 (g)
may be found in Odmark, A Practitioner'sGuide to Subchapter S Planning
Opportunitiesand Pitfalls, 30 J. TAXATION 360, 362 (1969).
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